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ABSTRACT
MEASURING THE EXTENT OF VOICE PITCH BIAS IN VOTER BEHAVIOR
ASLI CEREN ÇINAR
Economics M.A. THESIS, July 2020
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Özgür Kıbrıs
Keywords: voice pitch, female candidates, electability, political trust, competence
This thesis examines the extent of voice pitch bias on the electability of political can-
didates. In a survey experiment, undergraduate students listened to the manipulated
voice recordings of both male and female candidates. These included different polit-
ical statements to investigate any interactive impact of voice pitch and gender of the
political candidates. I find that both from t-test and multivariate logistic regression
analysis, candidates with the low voice, i.e. more masculine voices, increases their
probability of winning an election, and also voters perceive the low voice candidates
more trustworthy and competent compared to a high voice opponent. Manipulating
the content of the political statements, I detect a disproportionate effect of voice
pitch on male and female candidates’ probability of winning the election. Female
candidates maintain the advantage obtained from having a low voice longer than a
low voice male candidate. I observe this case where both male and female candi-
dates are running opposed to a same-sex candidate with a high-pitched voice who
advocates for a more desirable policy. However, female candidates lose this advan-
tage at some point. Hence, there is a trade-off between voice pitch and the policy
stance of the candidates. Besides, voters’ characteristics also have an impact on
their probability of voting for the low voice candidates. Even though a female voter
votes more for a low voice candidate than a male voter, this effect is not significant.
However, I find that as the voter has more monthly household income, the more she
votes for the low-pitched candidate.
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ÖZET
SEÇMEN DAVRANIŞINDA SES FREKANSI ÖN YARGISININ BOYUTUNUN
ÖLÇÜLMESİ
ASLI CEREN ÇINAR
EKONOMİ YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2020
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Özgür Kıbrıs
Anahtar Kelimeler: ses frekansı, kadın adaylar, seçilebilirlik, politik güven,
yetkinlik
Bu tez, ses freansının siyasi adayların seçilebilirliğine yönelik önyargı derecesini
incelemektedir. Bir anket deneyinde, lisans öğrencileri hem erkek hem de kadın
adayların manipüle edilmiş ses kayıtlarını dinlediler. Bu kayıtlar, ses frekansının
ve siyasi adayların cinsiyetinin etkileşimli etkilerini araştırmak için farklı siyasi
ifadeler içeriyordu. Hem t-testi hem de çok değişkenli lojistik regresyon analizin-
den, kalın sesli (düşük frekanslı) adayların, diğer bir deyişle daha maskülen sesli,
seçim kazanma şanslarını arttırdığını ve aynı zamanda seçmenlerin kalın sesli aday-
ları ince sesli (yüksek frekanslı) bir rakipten daha güvenilir ve yetkin gördüklerine
ulaştım. Siyasi ifadelerin içeriğini değiştirerek, ses frekansının erkek ve kadın aday-
ların seçimi kazanma olasılığı üzerinde orantısız bir etkisini olduğunu tespit ettim.
Kadın adayların, kalın sesli erkek adaylardan daha uzun süre kalın sese sahip ol-
manın avantajını sürdüklerini buldum. Ancak, kadın adaylar bu avantajı bir nok-
tada kaybederler. Dolayısıyla, adayların ses kalınlıkları ile adayların politika duruşu
arasında bir değişkenlik vardır. Ayrıca, seçmenlerin karakteristik özellikleri kalın
sesli adaylar için oy kullanma şanslarını da etkiler. Bir kadın seçmen, kalın sesli bir
aday için bir erkek seçmenden daha fazla oy verse de, bu etki istatistiksel anlamda
önemli bulunmamıştır. Ancak, seçmenlerin aylık hane gelirleri arttıkça kalın sesli
adaylara daha fazla oy verdiğini görüyorum.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Working with a voice coach, Margaret Thatcher lowered her voice pitch by 46 Hz1
which is tantamount to half the average difference between female voice pitch and
male voice pitch. Lowering the pitch of her voice may be one of the crucial deter-
minants on the election of Margaret Thatcher as the prime minister of the United
Kingdom in the 1970s.
Why is lowering your voice pitch important in getting elected? The answer to this
question has been a great interest in the literature especially for its focus on gender
differences in the elections and female candidates. Low voices signal masculinity,
trustworthiness, competence, and strength not only in our everyday interactions with
other people but also in the elections where we observe power dynamics (Klofstad
2016, 2017; O’Connor and Barclay 2017; Pavela Banai, Banai, and Bovan 2017;
Puts et al. 2007). A common finding in the literature suggests that candidates with
lower-pitched voices increase their chance of being elected compared to an opponent
with a higher-pitched voice (Anderson and Klofstad 2012; Klofstad, Anderson, and
Peters 2012; Laustsen, Petersen, and Klofstad 2015; Tigue et al. 2012). Here arises
the gender dimension of the importance of voice pitch in electoral settings. Typical
female voice pitch ranges between 165-255 Hz while typical male voice ranges from 85
Hz to 180 Hz (Feinberg, Jones, Little, Burt, and Perrett 2005; Vieira, Gadenz, and
Cassol 2015). Naturally, this makes male voices lower than typical female voices. As
a result, the signals of masculinity, trust, and competence perceived from the voice
pitch leverages a male candidate over a female candidate. Not only male candidates
benefit from having a lower-pitched voice when there is a female opponent but when
male-male and female-female candidates are running against each other the one
with low voice has an increased probability of winning (Klofstad 2016). Lowering
her voice, then, must have played an undeniably important role in the election of
Margaret Thatcher.
The literature on voice pitch bias focuses on the isolated effect of voice pitch on
1"Voice pitch is the perceived “highness” or “lowness” of a voice as influenced by fundamental frequency
(F0)" (Klofstad and Anderson 2018, 349).
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electability. However, Laustsen, Petersen, and Klofstad (2015) take into account the
partisanship of the voter and its interaction with the low-voiced political candidate.
They found that voters with a more conservative stance prefer to vote for low voice
candidates relatively more than the voters with a more liberal, left-wing ideological
stance. But yet, the voice pitch literature rarely focuses on other determinants
that can have an impact on the perception of competence, trustworthiness, and the
electability. In this study, I account for the voter’s ideology and income -besides
voters’ gender- to detect any idiosyncratic effects. However, our study differentiates
from Laustsen, Petersen, and Klofstad (2015) by adding political statements to the
candidates’ voice recordings. This leads us to our key contribution to the voice pitch
bias literature; to measure the extent of voice pitch bias by changing the candidates’
policy statements.
This study experimentally tests whether the policy stance of a political candidate
mitigates the impact of low-pitched voice on her or his electability. I conducted
a survey experiment with undergraduate students at Sabancı University, a private
university in Istanbul, Turkey. Participants chose to vote for either low- or high-
pitched candidate for eighteen different electoral setup after rating candidates’ trust-
worthiness and competence. Differentiating the extent of the voice pitch bias by the
candidate’s gender reflects if voice pitch nudges voters’ gender stereotyping in the
political arena. In this research, I would like to focus on voice pitch’s impact on the
candidates’ electability and their perceived competency and trustworthiness.
This study will diverge from the current literature by testing the projected electoral
advantage generated by the lower voice pitch with the aim of finding the condition
when this advantage is lost as the candidate with lower voice pitch advocates for
a less favorable policy. Findings on the perception of trust and competence are
parallel with the literature where both male and female candidates benefit from
having a lower-pitched voice. Moreover, the baseline comparison of high- and low-
pitched voices where both candidates voice exactly the same political statements,
the candidate with low voice gets significantly more votes. In addition to this, I
find significant differences in the effect of voice pitch on the electability of male and
female candidates. As the candidate with a low voice articulates a less desirable
policy than her or his opponent, the advantage obtained from voice pitch gradually
decreases. However, in this situation, voters are quicker to switch their votes to
the high voice candidate in a male-male setup compared to the case when they are
choosing between two female candidates. Hence, this study is, to my knowledge,
the first in the field to study the extent of the trade-off between low-pitched voice
and political stance. My analysis explores the gender perspective in voters’ behavior
and relatively different weights given to the importance of voice pitch for female and
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male candidates.
This paper comprises of four main chapters where the first one is an overview of
current literature on voice pitch bias and its impact on gender stereotyping of voters.
The second main chapter is where we present the research design of our study in
detail. The description of our data, the technicalities behind vocal manipulations,
the choice for policy issues and the determination of the political statements of can-
didates, and the experimental procedure are meticulously presented in the research
design chapter. Third, comes the section on the trust and competence perception
analysis towards candidates. We begin this section by presenting our method of
analysis and then following by a results subsection. Fourth and our last main chap-
ter is about the electability of the low voice candidates. Our key contribution to the
voice pitch bias literature is mainly included in this part. In the method of analysis
subsection, we present our model identifications. The results subsection discusses
our findings. After examining these chapters, conclusion section summarize our key
findings, limitations for this study, and a future research agenda.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Personality traits enter the calculus of voting as determining variables. Considering
the importance of vocal characteristics as an indicator of some personality traits,
vocal signals reveal information about the signaler. Animals can collect informa-
tion about a potential mate or a challenger from these vocal cues (Feinberg, Jones,
DeBruine, Moore, Law Smith, Cornwell, Tiddeman, Boothroyd, and Perrett 2005;
Jones et al. 2010; Puts et al. 2007). One prominent vocal property, voice pitch
attracts attention in the literature for its importance in influencing humans’ per-
spectives towards others. Voice pitch is “the number of vibrations per second made
by the vocal folds to produce a vocalization" and is influenced by fundamental fre-
quency (F0) (Tusing and Dillard 2000, 150). Slower vibration of the larger vocal
folds generates lower frequencies than are smaller vocal folds, hence lower sounding
voice is obtained.
Voice pitch signals information about some physical and psychological traits such as
attractiveness (Feinberg, Jones, DeBruine, Moore, Law Smith, Cornwell, Tiddeman,
Boothroyd, and Perrett 2005), social and physical dominance (Puts et al. 2007; Re-
zlescu et al. 2015; Tigue et al. 2012), and reproductive capabilities (Feinberg, Jones,
DeBruine, Moore, Law Smith, Cornwell, Tiddeman, Boothroyd, and Perrett 2005).
Some recent studies also presented experimental and empirical evidence on the ef-
fect of voice pitch in the perception of competence, leadership abilities, electability,
trustworthiness, as well as its effect on vote choice (Anderson and Klofstad 2012;
Klofstad 2016; Klofstad and Anderson 2018; Klofstad, Anderson, and Nowicki 2015;
Nagel, Maurer, and Reinemann 2012; O’Connor and Barclay 2017; Pavela Banai,
Banai, and Bovan 2017; Sei Jin Ko, Judd, and Stapel 2009; Tigue et al. 2012). This
line of research shows that people are inclined to find lower-pitched voices more
attractive, more masculine, stronger, more dominant. Therefore, mating related
instincts echo themselves in political contexts. These perceived physical and psy-
chological traits lead lower voice pitch candidates to have a higher probability of
winning an election .
One common crucial finding in these studies is that lower voice pitch reflects com-
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petence and strength. Having higher pitched voice affects the perception of compe-
tence. Sei Jin Ko, Judd, and Stapel (2009) created some male and female sounding
resumes for job applications and presented these resumes accompanied with a male
or female voice. In an experimental setting where undergraduate students rated the
presented both vocal and in-text resumes in terms of competence and warmth, they
find that job applicants with lower voice pitch are rated higher for being competent
whereas rated lower for their warmth. This finding applies to both male and fe-
male applicants. In an experimental study, Klofstad, Anderson, and Nowicki (2015)
manipulates the pitch of recorded partisan neutral statements and finds that voters
prefer lower voice pitched leaders since their voice reflects competence, strength, and
physical prowess.
In the literature, the perceived trustworthiness of the lower-pitched voice has been
discussed in some conflicting studies. O’Connor and Barclay (2017) find that per-
ceived trustworthiness from voice pitch depends on the context. Moreover, their
experimental study results show that low pitch female voices are more trustwor-
thy in a general context which is parallel to Klofstad, Anderson, and Peters (2012).
However, O’Connor and Barclay (2017) find that people trust high pitch male voices
more in a general context. This finding differs from Tigue et al. (2012) where they
show low pitch male voices are more trustworthy. This study contributes to this dis-
cussion by testing for the trustworthiness of both male and female candidates when
they are recorded saying a policy-neutral statement; “Vote for me.” Since partici-
pants rate their trust for both lowered and heightened versions of the same voice, I
will present their perceptions of trust for the different voice pitched candidates from
both sexes.
Tigue et al. (2012) manipulated voice recordings of nine US presidents to see if the
lower-pitched version of these presidents’ voices influence the voting behavior more
than the higher-pitched version. After experimenting with the same stimuli with
unfamiliar male voices, they find that both male and female voters prefer lower-
pitched versions. However, this study does not reflect the voice pitch bias for female
candidates. Klofstad, Anderson, and Peters (2012) and Anderson and Klofstad
(2012) experimentally study the effect of lower-pitched voices for both male and
female candidates. As a common finding, both male and female voters prefer female
candidates with lower voice pitch. Unlike women, men preferred men with masculine
voices. Women did not have a significant preference for voice pitch when they were
listening to male candidates. The reason behind the difference in response of male
and female candidates may arise from the physical strength signal perceived from
low pitch voice. Low pitched male voices signal physical dominance to other males
hence this physical threat is likely to be a determinant in the male-male competition
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even in a political context (Puts et al. 2007).
Gender is also one of the most prominent traits voters can perceive at first sight.
Hence this attribute can have an impact on their voting decisions, and this reflects
itself sometimes in the shape of gender-based mistrust of political candidates and
sometimes more subtle and implicit gender bias for competence on specific political
issues.
In an empirical study, Koch (2000) finds that voters use gender stereotypes to pre-
sume a candidate’s political ideology. Voters perceive female candidates more lib-
eral than their male counterparts. This serves to increase the ideological distance
between a female Democratic candidate and the citizens but decrease the distance
between a female Republican candidate and most citizens. Voters characterize politi-
cal issues as male-congenial or female-congenial according to an experimental study
conducted by Eagly et al. (2003). The gender-based congeniality effect emerges
when voters give emphasis on their sex and candidates’ attitudes. This study finds
that women but not men attach to the candidate characteristics that favor their
gender’s interests. To voters, some political issues sound as more male-competent
policy areas while others sound as more female-competent (Dolan 2010) . Based
on these studies, Searles et al. (2017) define the term gender issue ownership as
"having reputation for handling political problems" (6). For example, issues related
to the military, economy, or crime are associated with men while issues related to
education, childcare, or senior citizens are associated with women.
The literature also finds that a voter’s political alliances can play an important role
in her voting decision. For example, partisanship can interact with the gender con-
geniality effect in voting such that Democratic voters are more likely to vote for a
female than a male-congenial candidate whereas it is the opposite for Republican
voters (Eagly et al. 2003). Dolan (2014) also emphasizes the importance of the polit-
ical party in gender-stereotypical approach to political candidates. Yet, the findings
can bring a controversial perspective to the discussion of gender in politics. The
study, after surveying more than 3000 US adults, concludes that the political party
remains the most important factor in voting decisions regardless of the candidate’s
gender. Mo (2015) takes into account the explicit and implicit gender bias that
may arise during calculus of voting1. This means that a lot of studies fall into so-
cial desirability bias2 since voters can still have implicit gender bias outside of their
1"Implicit (explicit) attitudes are defined as preferences that exist outside (inside) of conscious awareness."
(Mo 2015, 359)
2Social desirability bias is the tendency of survey respondents to answer questions in a manner that will
be viewed favorably by others. It can take the form of over-reporting "good behavior" or under-reporting
"bad", or undesirable behavior.
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conscious awareness. Moreover, the empirical results suggest that any explicit or
implicit attitudes against a female leader decrease the tendency to vote for a female
candidate.
This area of research is facing the lack of studying the interaction effects between
gender stereotypes in politics and voice pitch which I am planning to tackle. Mainly
the effect of lower-voice pitch can be modulated by different personality traits and
political stances. The current experimental literature on voice-pitch uses policy-
neutral audio recordings to present the voter to isolate the effect of voice-pitch from
other electoral determinants. However, the political stance can be an extremely
crucial factor for the electability of the candidates. Some political issues sound more
male competent policy areas whereas voters evaluate other issues such as health and
education as more female competent areas (Dolan 2010; Mo 2015; Searles et al. 2017).
In another study by Koch (2000), the political ideology of female candidates is found
to be a critical force to reduce the distance between the candidate’s policy stance and
voters’ ideology. Therefore, voters may switch their votes to the candidate with a






Participants (N= 186) included 70 female and 115 male -1 participant did not pre-
fer to specify their birth sex and their gender identity- undergraduate students at
Sabanci University.1 Participants ranged in age from 19 to 29 (mean age of the
participants were 22 with a standard deviation of 0.12). Students who are currently
enrolled in the introductory courses of economics received an email link that gives
them access to the survey in the Qualtrics platform.2 Participants either listened to
the voice recordings with computer speakers (n=142) or with headphones (n=45).
Students received course credits in exchange for their participation. Only the course
instructors had access to the student identification numbers but not to their an-
swers to the survey questions. Anonymity of the participants is respected hence
their identities are kept confidential.
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for demographic and political character-
istics of survey participants. In this table, education level equals to 6 represents
undergraduate students. Since, the survey is distributed to undergraduate students
the standard deviation shows almost no variation. Monthly household income level
ranges between 1 to 12, 1 representing a monthly income level of less than 600 $
1Students answered questions asking about both their birth sex and their gender identity with six different
answer choices. All our participants but one defined their gender identity the same as their birth sex and
none of them stated any gender identity different than female and male.
2Protocols for this study were approved by Sabancı University Ethics Committee.
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whereas income level equals to 12 represents monthly household income more than
6600 $.3 Monthly household income level creates the desired variation, which will be
included as a control variable to the analysis of electability. Participation dummy
variable indicates if the subjects to the survey voted in the last elections. Gen-
eral trust towards others shows 1 if the participant selected "Most people can be
trusted" or 2 if the participant selected "I must be very careful in dealing with peo-
ple". Satisfaction variable is a categorical variable ranging from "Strongly disagree
to strongly agree" where the question asked was about the participants’ satisfaction
from education and healthcare policies.
Percent distribution of the participants’ monthly income and their stance on a
left-right scale is presented below in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. Left right ideology
scale ranging from 0 to 10, 0 representing extreme left and 10 representing extreme
right is normalized to a 0-1 scale.4 Their monthly household income level ranged
from less than 600$ to 6600$ shown in Figure 3.1.
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for the Participants to the Experiment
VARIABLES Observations Mean Std Dev. Min Median Max
Age 186 22.21 1.665 19 22 29
Education level 186 5.839 0.823 3 6 10
Monthly household income level 186 6.968 3.612 1 6 12
Participation 186 0.930 0.256 0 1 1
Left-Right Ideology 185 0.388 0.199 0 0.400 1
Trust towards others 186 1.957 0.203 1 2 2
Satisfaction 186 3.634 1.280 2 4 6
3.1.2 Vocal Stimuli
Six native Turkish speakers -three females with an average age of 38 and three males
with an average age of 40- were recorded speaking the following policy statements
3Monthly household income level is adjusted for the TL/US dollars currency rate.
4The left-right ideology variable is self reported following CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems)-
Turkey questions.
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Figure 3.1 Monthly Household Income Level
Figure 3.2 Left-Right Ideology
in Turkish:5
• “Please vote for me.”
• “I will allocate X Turkish liras per person annually for education expenditures.”
• “I will allocate X Turkish liras per person annually for health expenditures.”
I chose to record more than one candidate for each gender to reduce the possible
impact of the idiosyncrasies of any one candidate.
5All the candidates self identified as male or female. In this thesis I refer to them according to this identi-
fication. However, I am aware that the gender spectrum provides us a range and it is not binary. This is
consistent with the previous literature. The survey did not inform participants about the candidates’ gen-
der. The participants only listened to the recording without any explanatory and identifiable information
about the candidate.
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The monetary amount X has the maximal value of 10 000 Turkish liras and this
amount decreased by 200 Turkish liras in six increments. Hence, both education
and health policy statements were recorded twelve times with different monetary
amounts for male and female candidates.
Voices were recorded as .mp4 files using an iPhone microphone. I inspected each
audio file aurally and visually in Audacity (v.2.3.3; audacityteam.org)6. Before con-
verting the audio files into .wav format, I ensured that the recordings were without
speech errors and background noise. Then, I used Get Pitch command in Praat
software (Boersma and Weenink 2020, v.6.1.15) to determine the mean pitch of the
recordings. The mean pitch of unaltered female voices is 239 Hz and standard de-
viation 14 Hz. The mean pitch of unaltered male voices is 134 Hz and standard
deviation 12 Hz.
I created a lower-pitched and higher-pitched version of each voice recordings us-
ing the Pitch-Synchronous Overlap Add (PSOLA) method in Praat software. This
method allows us to manipulate fundamental frequency and harmonics whilst con-
trolling the other spectrotemporal aspects of the acoustic signal (Feinberg, Jones,
Little, Burt, and Perrett 2005). Following the literature, I altered the recordings
±0.5 equivalent rectangular bandwidth (ERB) where each recording was converted
into a pair of recordings, one with higher-pithed and one with lower-pitched (Jones
et al. 2010; Klofstad and Anderson 2018; Tigue et al. 2012). ±ERB manipulation
accounts for a perceivable shift of ±20 Hz. Manipulating the recordings by ERB
corrects for the logarithmic difference between actual fundamental frequency and
perceived fundamental frequency hence I could produce a constant perceivable gap
between the raised and lowered versions of the recordings regardless of their initial
fundamental frequency. I conducted a pre-test to control for the perceivable gap
between the manipulated voices and 90% of the participants reported the difference
between manipulated voices.
3.1.3 Political Statements
I chose to use monetary units to test my hypothesis about mitigating the impact of
low-pitched voices on electability with candidate’s policy stance. Here, monetary
units signal the candidate’s policy stance to better measure the policy’s impact
6Audacity® software is copyright © 1999-2020 Audacity Team. The name Audacity® is a registered trade-
mark of Dominic Mazzoni.
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on the electoral advantage of low-pitched voice. In this study I formed the
candidates’ policy statements around two issues; healthcare and education. The
former quickly gained importance during Covid-19 pandemic in the first half of
2020. Besides, to compare the issue importance for the reduction in electoral
advantage with a relatively less media-attention grabbing issue in Turkey during
2020 I decided to select education. Another determinant for the choice of these
two issues are coming from their difference in public satisfaction as seen in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 Satisfaction from Education and Healthcare Services
Figure 3.4 shows that it is crucial for the state to provide basic services like edu-
cation (absolutely important: 60.64% of the participants) or healthcare (absolutely
important: 55.91% of the participants) to the public. This is why in this paper,
"less desirable monetary policy" is defined to be a monetary amount which is less
than the opponent’s offered amount.
To find a common monetary unit for both education and healthcare policy state-
ments, I have consulted the OECD’s education and healthcare reports for Turkey
(OECD 2018, 2019a). The latest available data states that yearly spending per
capita on education is 4505,48 $ whereas yearly government-financed healthcare ex-
penditure per capita is 957,1 $. The mean of these two values is taken and then
converted to Turkish lira with the currency exchange rate of January 2019. I then
rounded this converted value to the nearest thousand steps. This is how I ended
up with the maximal amount, 10 000 TL, spent on both education and healthcare
services.
The main hypothesis here is to test whether the advantage obtained from having a
lower-pitched voice can be reduced by advocating a less desirable monetary policy,
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Figure 3.4 Importance of government spending for education and healthcare
Survey Question: "How important do you think that governments
provide education/healthcare services?"
i.e. the trade-off between the voters’ preference for a candidate with lower-pitched
voice and the candidate’s policy stance. I aim to find an exact switching point
from voting for the candidate with a lower-pitched voice to the candidate with a
higher-pitched voice by incrementally decreasing the monetary unit in the policy
statement of lower-pitched voice for the expenditures of education and healthcare
services. Analyzing the pre-test survey results, the increments are determined to be
equal to 200 TL.7 Thus, in six steps the budget proposed by the lower-pitched voice
decreased to 9000 TL.
3.2 Procedure
I organized the experiments into two blocks, one for the education and the second
one for the healthcare. In the education block, the voice recordings presented were
“I will allocate X Turkish liras per person annually for education expenditures.” The
health block consisted of the recordings stating, “I will allocate X Turkish liras per
person annually for health expenditures.” Subjects listened to each pair of female
7I ran the pretest with 50 participants. There, the increments were 500 TL and the maximal amount
proposed was 5,000 TL. After analyzing the results, I saw that a 500 TL incremental decrease did not
capture any difference between male and female candidates with low-pitched voices on their electability.
Moreover, 500 TL increments caused very significant shifts in votes. Hence, I decided to decrease the
increments to 200 TL in the experiment.
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and male voices through their computer speaker or headphones and then responded
to the question, “If these two candidates were running against each other, who
would you vote for?” Subjects participated multiple elections in order to minimize
the pseudoreplication bias.8
Other than the policy statements, both blocks included the trust and competence
perception questions towards the lower and higher-pitched versions of female and
male candidates. For trust and competence questions subjects listened to the fol-
lowing recordings, “Please vote to me.”
Voters chose whether to use computer speakers (n=142) or headphones (n=45).9
The policy statements involving the budget for either healthcare or education ex-
penditures were presented randomly to the subjects to eliminate the order effect
(Holt and Laury 2005).
First, subjects rated the trustworthiness and competence for both lower and higher-
pitched versions of a female and male voice. Then they were asked to vote for
one of the randomly presented the policy statement recordings. They voted for
both female-female candidates and male-male candidates. The difference in voice
recordings other than the pitch is the monetary amount that the candidates proposed
to spend on health or education expenditures. For a total of six candidates, the
design involves 2 (candidate gender: female vs. male) × 2 (policy type: health vs.
education) × 2 (voice pitch: high vs. low within gender) within-participant factors
(Charness, Gneezy, and Kuhn 2012).
The results obtained from online voice pitch experiments are comparable to the
results from laboratory experiments (Feinberg et al. 2008).
8"If treatments are spatially or temporally segregated, if all replicates of a treatment are somehow inter-
connected, or if “replicates” are only samples from a single experimental unit, then replicates are not
independent. If one uses the data from such experiments to test for treatment effects, then one is commit-
ting pseudoreplication" (Hurlbert 1984, 198).
9At the end of the survey, subjects answered the question about any problems with listening the recordings.
The participants stated any problems with listening were excluded from the sample of analysis.
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4. TRUSTWORTHINESS AND COMPETENCE
4.1 Method of Analysis
Trust and competence questions were asked on a Likert-scale from 1 to 4, from not
trustworthy/competent at all to completely trustworthy/competent. Participants
rated the trustworthiness and competence of either female or male candidates. They
listened to both low- and high-pitched versions of the same candidate hence they
listened to a total of six recordings.
I take participants as the unit of analysis. I calculated a trustworthiness and a
competence measure for each participant by taking the average of their ratings for
each low- and high-pitched version of all of the candidates. To determine if there
is a significant difference for trustworthiness and competence ratings of low- and
high-pitched voices, I conducted a two-sample paired t-test and compared the mean
trust and competence ratings for female and male candidates (Gerber and Green
2012).
4.2 Results
As shown in Figure 4.1, voters trust male candidates with low voice more than
high voice male candidate (mean difference=.125±.05, p-value=.018). Voters also
find low voice male candidates significantly more competent than high voice male
candidates (mean difference=.194±.06, p-value=.001).
Figure 4.2 shows that the effect of low voice on the perception of trustworthiness
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Figure 4.1 Trust and Competence Ratings for Male Candidates
* Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predictions
calculated from conditional standard errors.
and competence maintains its importance in the case of female candidates. I found
that participants find female candidates with low voice more trustworthy (mean dif-
ference=.159±.07, p-value=.021) and more competent (mean difference=.385±.07,
p-value=.000) relative to a high voice female candidate.
Figure 4.2 Trust and Competence Ratings for Female Candidates
* Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predictions
calculated from conditional standard errors.
Two-sample t-test results in Table 4.1 reveal in detail that both male and female
candidates benefit from having low voice in terms of being perceived as more trust-
worthy and competent relative to their high voice opponents. The significance of
the difference is higher when I look at the competence perceptions. The results
indicate that the impact of having a low voice is higher for the perception of com-
petence. Hence, voters’ evaluation for competence is more sensitive to masculine
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voices then for trustworthiness. Yet, voters evaluate the low voice candidates signif-
icantly higher. I also tested for the perceptions of trust and competence of candidates
between male and female voters, but I did not find any significant difference. Lower-
pitched voices’ positive impact on their perceived trustworthiness and competence
align with Anderson and Klofstad (2012); Tigue et al. (2012).
Table 4.1 Two Sample T-test Results for the Difference in Trust and Competence
Ratings
Observations Mean (low) Mean (high) Difference Std. Error t-value p-value
Trust/ Female Candidates 90 2.503 2.345 .159 .068 2.35 .021∗∗
Trust/ Male Candidates 96 2.302 2.177 .125 .052 2.4 .018∗∗
Competence/ Female Candidates 90 2.667 2.281 .385 .072 5.4 0∗∗∗
Competence/ Male Candidates 96 2.406 2.212 .194 .058 3.35 .001∗∗∗
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5. ELECTABILITY
5.1 Method of Analysis
To study the electability of the candidates with lower-pitched voices, I conducted
both two sample paired t-test and multivariate logistic regression analysis. For the
t-test analysis, I take the participant as unit of analysis. As each participant voted
for six different political statements for each of the three candidates, I calculated
an average score for voting for low voice candidate for each political statement by
following Laustsen, Petersen, and Klofstad (2015). Then, the average vote mea-
sure for each statement is normalized between 0 and 1 in order to treat the main
dependent variable as a probability. To illustrate, for each participant, when low
voice candidate states that she or he will annually spend 10,000 TL per person for
education or healthcare, I assigned a probability of voting for low voice between 0
and 1. Being closer to 1 for this variable means that the participant is highly likely
to vote for the low voice candidate when this candidates spends 10,000 TL for ed-
ucation or healthcare. Two sample t-test analysis allowed us to compare the mean
probability of voting for the low voice whether there occurs any significant differ-
ence between different political statements. I conducted eight different two sample
t-test to better test if candidate’s gender and the political issue have an effect on
the electability. T-test tables presented below represents the difference in means
comparing each incremental decrease in the monetary policy of low voice candidate
and also comparing the mean votes for low voice candidates when they offer 10,000
TL with his or her different policy statements.
Considering the probabilistic nature of the dependent variable, for the second
analysis, I applied multivariate logistic regression to study for the effect of policy
difference on the electability of the candidate with low-pitched voice. The model
specification is as follows:
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Pr(Voting for Low Voice)= βˆ0 + βˆ1 (Policy Difference) + βˆ2 (Female Candidate)
+ βˆ3 (Policy Difference x Female Candidate) + βˆ4 (Healthcare) + βˆ5 (Healthcare
x Female Candidate)+ µX
The unit of analysis to study the electability of low-pitched voices is the outcome
of each comparison made by the participants. I adopted within subject design since
each candidate is compared with his or her own voice but with different pitch.
A vote for the candidate with low-pitched voice is coded as 1 whereas a vote for
the high voice candidate is coded as 0. Therefore, the dependent variable for the
analysis is the probability of voting for the low voice which ranges between 0 and 1.
Considering the probabilistic nature of the dependent variable I applied multivariate
logistic regression to study the effect of policy difference on the electability of the
candidate with low-pitched voice.
I treated the main independent variable in two ways; first as a continuous variable
and second as a categorical variable. The reason behind adding policy difference vari-
able as a discrete variable is to better capture any vote switching behavior between
male and female candidates. In addition, controlling for a continuous independent
variable shows a more general impact of policy difference on the probability of voting
for low voice. The discrete policy difference variable takes values 0, 200, 400, 600,
800, and 1000. The policy difference variable indicates the monetary difference in
the political statements between the low- and high-pitched candidates. the second
independent variable is a dummy variable for female candidates. The female candi-
date variable takes the value 0 if for that electoral comparison the voter compared
male candidates and takes 1 if the candidates were females. To better understand
the effect of policy difference’s magnitude on the electability of the low-pitched voice
and compare this effect between male and female candidates, I added an interaction
term to the logistic regression model following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006a).
The interaction of policy difference and female candidate variables is a categorical
variable hence, I can be better able to differentiate the impact of low voice for male
and female candidates.
Voters’ gender, monthly household income level, and left-right ideology are also
controlled for and represented as X variables in the above equation. Voter’s gender
is coded as Female Voter and it takes 0 if the voter is male and 1 if the voter is female.
I add the voter’s gender variable to control for any gender-related implications on
the electability of low-voice candidates which may reveal any gender stereotyping
difference between male and female voters. Monthly household income level is a
measure between 1 and 12, 1 indicating the lowest income level which is less than
19
600 $ and 12 indicating the highest income level which is more than 6600 $. As
I move on to the left-right ideology variable, a 0-10 scale is normalized to 0-1. 0
implies an extreme left-wing voter whereas 1 implies an extreme right-wing voter
and accordingly the higher Left-Right Ideology variable is the more right-wing is
the participant.
5.2 Results
I present the t-test results where two sample paired t-test results demonstrate
if there is a significant change in the probability of voting for low voice when
the candidate with the low voice suggests spending less money on education of
healthcare than her or his opponent. The opponent is actually the manipulated
higher-pitched version of the same candidate.
Table 5.1 Two Sample T-test for the Incremental Change in Votes of Low-Pitched
Female Voice in Healthcare
Policy Change for Low Voice Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference Std. Error t-value p-value
from 10,000 TL to 9,800 TL .637 .629 .008 .062 .1 .904
from 9,800 TL to 9,600 TL .629 .629 0 .044 0 1
from 9,600 TL to 9,400 TL .629 .599 .03 .043 .7 .479
from 9,400 TL to 9,200 TL .599 .603 -.004 .051 -.05 .941
from 9,200 TL to 9,000 TL .603 .492 .11 .062 1.75 .084∗
Observations 46 44
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.2 Two Sample T-test for the Overall Change in Votes of Low-Pitched Female
Voice in Healthcare
Policy Change for Low Voice Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference Std. Error t-value p-value
from 10,000 TL to 9,800 TL .637 .629 .008 .062 .1 .904
from 10,000 TL to 9,600 TL .637 .629 .008 .064 .1 .906
from 10,000 TL to 9,400 TL .637 .599 .038 .065 .6 .559
from 10,000 TL to 9,200 TL .637 .603 .034 .065 .55 .601
from 10,000 TL to 9,000 TL .637 .492 .144 .066 2.2 .033∗∗
Observations 44 44
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.1 shows the case when the participants votes only for female candidates
and the policy issue is about healthcare. I present the difference in mean votes for
low-pitched female voices when they are incrementally decreasing their monetary
policy. Up until the point where the female candidate is suggesting spending 9,000
TL, low voice female candidates, on average, has more than .50 percent probability
of winning. In consequence, this indicates that female candidates benefit from
having a low-pitched voice even though they advocate for a less desirable monetary
spending on healthcare policies. On this table, only the change between offering
9,200 TL and 9,000 TL significantly decreases the probability of winning the
election for the female candidate with low voice. Although the advantage of having
a low voice is carried out a long time for female candidates, Table 5.3 shows
that voters significantly votes less for male candidates when they decrease the
monetary amount spend on healthcare from 10,000 TL to 9,800 TL. Even though,
the probability of voting for the low voice, on average, is greater than .50 until male
candidates offer 9,200 TL. However, voters are more responsive in policy change for
male candidates compared to female candidates. Tables 5.2 and 5.4 compares the
difference in mean votes for low-pitched candidates offering to spend 10,000 TL in
healthcare and the incrementally decreased monetary amount. Both Table 5.2 and
Table 5.4 support the results obtained from Table 5.1 and 5.3.
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Table 5.3 Two Sample T-test for the Incremental Change in Votes of Low-Pitched
Male Voice in Healthcare
Policy Change for Low Voice Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference Std. Error t-value p-value
from 10,000 TL to 9,800 TL .702 .517 .184 .057 3.2 .003∗∗∗
from 9,800 TL to 9,600 TL .517 .532 -.014 .044 -.3 .75
from 9,600 TL to 9,400 TL .532 .553 -.021 .055 -.4 .701
from 9,400 TL to 9,200 TL .553 .468 .085 .04 2.15 .038∗∗
from 9,200 TL to 9,000 TL .468 .408 .06 .045 1.35 .192
Observations 47 47
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.4 Two Sample T-test for the Overall Change in Votes of Low-Pitched Male
Voice in Healthcare
Policy Change for Low Voice Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference Std. Error t-value p-value
from 10,000 TL to 9,800 TL .702 .517 .184 .057 3.2 .003∗∗∗
from 10,000 TL to 9,600 TL .702 .532 .17 .06 2.85 .007∗∗∗
from 10,000 TL to 9,400 TL .702 .553 .149 .068 2.2 .034∗∗
from 10,000 TL to 9,200 TL .702 .468 .234 .062 3.75 .001∗∗∗
from 10,000 TL to 9,000 TL .702 .408 .294 .059 5 0∗∗∗
Observations 47 47
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.5 Two Sample T-test for the Incremental Change in Votes of Low-Pitched
Female Voice in Education
Policy Change for Low Voice Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference Std. Error t-value p-value
from 10,000 TL to 9,800 TL .558 .652 -.094 .064 -1.5 .145
from 9,800 TL to 9,600 TL .652 .602 .51 .043 1.2 .241
from 9,600 TL to 9,400 TL .602 .584 .018 .035 .55 .602
from 9,400 TL to 9,200 TL .584 .569 .014 .051 .3 .777
from 9,200 TL to 9,000 TL .569 .468 .101 .066 1.55 .133
Observations 46 46
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.5 and Table 5.7 respectively refers the analysis with female candidates and
male candidates when the policy issue is about education. For both female and male
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candidates, we have a common finding where the low voice candidates from both
genders have an electoral advantage. The mean votes for low voice candidates are
above .50 percent up until the offer of 9,200 TL for female candidates and up until
the offer 9,400 TL for male candidates. Yet even though the difference between the
means suggests a decrease in voting, there is no significant decrease in the probabil-
ity of voting for the low voice in female candidates whereas even a 200 TL decrease in
education spending offer significantly decreases the votes received by low voice male
candidates. Tables 5.6 and Table 5.8 also support these findings in an overall setting.
Table 5.6 Two Sample T-test for the Overall Change in Votes of Low-Pitched Female
Voice in Education
Policy Change for Low Voice Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference Std. Error t-value p-value
from 10,000 TL to 9,800 TL .558 .652 -.094 .064 -1.5 .145
from 10,000 TL to 9,600 TL .568 .61 -.043 .065 -.65 .513
from 10,000 TL to 9,400 TL .568 .592 -.025 .061 -.4 .685
from 10,000 TL to 9,200 TL .568 .578 -.011 .065 -.15 .871
from 10,000 TL to 9,000 TL .568 .465 .103 .064 1.6 .112
Observations 47 47
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5.7 Two Sample T-test for the Incremental Change in Votes of Low-Pitched
Male Voice in Education
Policy Change for Low Voice Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference Std. Error t-value p-value
from 10,000 TL to 9,800 TL .68 .514 .167 .066 2.55 .015∗∗
from 9,800 TL to 9,600 TL .514 .528 -.014 .046 -.3 .767
from 9,600 TL to 9,400 TL .528 .507 .021 .052 .4 .691
from 9,400 TL to 9,200 TL .507 .452 .056 .045 1.25 .221
from 9,200 TL to 9,000 TL .452 .476 -.024 .058 -.4 .675
Observations 48 25
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5.8 Two Sample T-test for the Overall Change in Votes of Low-Pitched Male
Voice in Education
Policy Change for Low Voice Mean 1 Mean 2 Difference Std. Error t-value p-value
from 10,000 TL to 9,800 TL .68 .514 .167 .066 2.55 .015∗∗
from 10,000 TL to 9,600 TL .68 .528 .153 .065 2.35 .023∗∗
from 10,000 TL to 9,400 TL .68 .507 .174 .061 2.85 .007∗∗∗
from 10,000 TL to 9,200 TL .68 .452 .229 .059 3.9 .001∗∗∗
from 10,000 TL to 9,000 TL .68 .476 .205 .06 3.4 .002∗∗∗
Observations 48 48
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The second method of analysis is the logistic regression. First, I present the re-
gression results from the multivariate logistic regression analysis where independent
variable, policy difference, is in the form of a continuous variable in Table 5.9. The
standard errors are robust clustered by participants. In column 1, policy difference’s
effect on the probability of voting for low voice is significantly negative. Female can-
didate and healthcare dummy variables tell us that if the candidate with low-pitched
voice is female or the policy issue is about healthcare, holding everything else on
average, increases the probability of voting for low voice candidate however these
effects are not significant. The female candidate and policy interaction term being
positive is also not significant. Column 2 includes healthcare and female candidate
interaction term. The model tells us that female candidates adopting healthcare
policy do not significantly have higher chance of being elected compared to a female
candidate adopting education policy or compared to a male candidate adopting
healthcare policy. Other than that, policy difference continues to significantly de-
crease the probability of voting for low voice. In columns 3,4, and 5, I added the
control variables one by one. As a result, I find that female voters, on average, vote
more for the low voice candidates, in other words for the masculine voice, compared
to male voters. However, this result is not significant. An increase in the monthly
household income level significantly increases the probability of voting for low voice.
Voters income level is then a determinant factor in voting for low voice candidate. I
will talk more about this impact in the next analysis where I separately tested the
findings for healthcare and education. Lastly, in column 5, a more left-wing a voter
is she or he insignificantly votes more in probability for the low voice candidate.
Figure 5.1 shows the odds ratio of our results from Table 5.9 with %95 confidence
intervals represented by the lines. Odds ratio means the ratio of the odds of an
event occurring in one group to the odds of it occurring in another group. Hence,
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Table 5.9 Logistic Regression Results on Probability of Voting for Low Voice
Dependent Variable:
Probability of Voting for Low Voice 1 2 3 4 5
Policy Difference -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.0990*** -0.0995*** -0.0996***
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140)
Female Candidate (dummy) 0.0329 0.00462 0.0311 0.0542 0.0484
(0.169) (0.202) (0.202) (0.199) (0.200)
Female Candidate x Policy Difference 0.0104 0.0104 0.00854 0.00851 0.00755
(0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0213)
Healthcare (dummy) 0.0587 0.0305 0.107 0.195 0.208
(0.149) (0.222) (0.225) (0.230) (0.233)
Healthcare x Female Candidate 0.0580 -0.0341 -0.0861 -0.0668
(0.298) (0.300) (0.302) (0.302)
Female Voter (dummy) 0.187 0.177 0.157
(0.152) (0.151) (0.153)




Constant 0.547*** 0.560*** 0.474*** 0.138 0.191
(0.129) (0.146) (0.162) (0.241) (0.266)
Observations 3,330 3,330 3,294 3,294 3,276
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the odds on the left of vertical line on 1 represent a negative effect on the probability
of voting for low voice whereas the ones on the right of vertical line on 1 represent
a positive effect. I decided to present average marginal effects to better predict
the results obtained from the logistic regression model with interaction terms. In
Figure 5.2, the light grey curve on the above of the figure shows us the difference
in the probabilities of voting for low voice between healthcare and education issues.
As there is a slight increase in the probability of voting for low voice in healthcare
policies compared to education policies, this difference gets smaller as the policy
difference increases. The female candidate line represents the difference between
male and female candidates in their probability of getting elected with respect to
the change in policy difference. Hence, the dark grey line tells us that as the policy
difference increases low voice female candidates’ probability of getting elected gets
higher than the low voice male candidates’. In Figure 5.3, I show the predicted
fitted values of the votes of low voice for male, female candidates, and the overall
decrease in votes with the increase in policy difference.
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Figure 5.1 Logistic Regression Results with Odds Ratio and Confidence Intervals
* Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the pre-
dictions calculated from conditional standard errors.
Figure 5.2 Average Marginal Effects of Candidate Gender and Policy Issue on Voting
for Low Voice
* Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the pre-
dictions calculated from conditional standard errors.
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Figure 5.3 Fitted Predictions for Voting for Low Voice
* Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the pre-
dictions calculated from conditional standard errors.
Second, I decided to analyze the experimental subgroups case by case as it is shown
in Table 5.10. I adopted univariate logistic regression, clustered standard errors by
participants, with the following logistic regression equation;
Pr (Voting for Low Voice)i,j = β0 + β1 (Policy Difference)i,j
where i stands for the candidates’ gender, male or female, and j stands for the policy
issue, either education or healthcare. Policy difference is a categorical variable hence,
I can be better able to detect if there is any switching effect of policy difference on
the voting for low voice to high voice.
Other than the second column where I checked for the effect of policy difference
on the probability of voting for low voice female candidates speaking for education,
there is a gradual decreasing effect of policy difference on the probability of voting
for low voice. To continue case by case, first, begin with the first column where
the dependent variable is the probability of voting for the male candidates with low-
pitched voices speaking for education. Here, the results show that there is a decrease
in the probability of getting elected for the low voice caused by an increase in the
policy difference. Moreover, significant decrease in the probability of voting for low-
pitched male voices occurs in each incremental decrease in the monetary policy in
education offered by the low-pitched. When I compare this result with the second
column where the increasing policy difference only enhances the probability of voting
for female candidates with low-pitched voices until the difference equals to 600 TL, I
can claim that advocating for a less desirable monetary policy than her high-pitched
opponent does not significantly change the probability of getting elected for the low
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voice female candidate up until the point where the difference is 1000 TL. Whereas,
an increased difference in high-pitched and low-pitched male candidates’ spending
on education have a significant negative impact on the probability of getting elected
for the low voice male candidates.
Columns three and four in Table 5.10, respectively show the impact of policy differ-
ence between low-pitched and high-pitched candidates on the probability of voting
for the low voice when the political statements are about healthcare. I see a negative
effect on the electability of both male and female candidates with a low voice as the
monetary difference between the policies of high-pitched and low-pitched candidates
grow. Although this decrease in the probability of being elected is significant for
male candidates on the point where the monetary difference is equal to 200 TL,
I do not observe a significant negative impact for female candidates up until the
policy difference is equal to 600 TL. Hence for healthcare statements, voters are
less responsive to less desirable monetary policies when they are voting for female
candidates compared to voting for male candidates. So, the advantage of having a
low voice on the probability of getting elected lasts longer for female candidates.
Comparing columns 1 to 3 and 2 to 4, within candidates’ gender, I claim that voters
are more responsive to switch for the high-pitched voices when the low voice states
spending a less desirable amount on both education and healthcare. Although, vot-
ers respond earlier to policy difference when they are comparing female candidates
in healthcare relative to female candidates in education.
Table 5.10 Logistic Regression Results on Probability of Voting for Low Voice by
Randomized Subgroups
Dependent Variable: (Education) (Education) (Healthcare) (Healthcare)
Probability of Voting for Low Voice Male Candidate Female Candidate Male Candidate Female Candidate
Policy Difference = 200 TL -0.701** 0.396 -0.786*** -0.0326
(0.280) (0.270) (0.241) (0.270)
Policy Difference = 400 TL -0.645** 0.148 -0.730*** -0.0326
(0.277) (0.273) (0.253) (0.274)
Policy Difference = 600 TL -0.729*** -0.291 -0.644** -0.560**
(0.259) (0.236) (0.288) (0.268)
Policy Difference = 800 TL -0.951*** -0.320 -0.985*** -0.590**
(0.252) (0.251) (0.266) (0.262)
Policy Difference = 1000 TL -1.150*** -0.644*** -1.456*** -0.927***
(0.239) (0.247) (0.256) (0.271)
Constant 0.756*** 0.233 0.857*** 0.560**
(0.193) (0.188) (0.189) (0.224)
Observations 864 828 846 792
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 5.4 Marginal Effect of Policy Differences Between Male and Female Candi-
dates
(a) Education (b) Healthcare
* Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predictions calculated from conditional
standard errors.
In Figure 5.4, I present the marginal effects of policy differences on the probability
of voting when the running candidate is female and male. Predictive margins are
clustered with a 95% confidence interval. Subfigure 5.4a shows the marginal effect
of policy difference in the case when the candidates adopted education in their
political statements and subfigure 5.4b shows when the political statements are
about healthcare government spending. Comparing female candidates to the male
candidates, voters are more responsive to a smaller amount of monetary change
when the candidate is male rather than a female candidate.
During the survey, respondents answered some demographic and political questions.
I decided to include some of them in the multivariate logistic regression model to
better understand any voter characteristics that may have an impact on voting for
the low-pitched voice. The results are presented in Table 5.11 where the first two
columns echo the results in Table 5.10 by integrating a female candidate dummy
variable. Focusing on columns 3 and 4, I can see if voter’s birth sex has an effect on
the probability of voting for the low voice. The female voter variable is a dummy
variable taking value 1 if the voter is female and 0 if the voter is male. Although
both columns have positive coefficients, female voters do not significantly increase
the probability of voting for low voice when they account for government spending
on healthcare compared to male voters, Figure 5.5b. Moreover, voter’s sex does not
have any significant increasing effect on the probability of voting for low voice in
education, Figure 5.5a. So, I claim that voter’s sex does not create any significant
bias against voting for low voice candidates.
Columns 5 and 6 include a discrete income level variable which ranges between 1 to
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12, 1 being the lowest level. The results are intuitive as monthly household income
level does not have any significant positive impact on the probability of voting for
low voice when the policy issue is about healthcare. However, when voters evaluate
the government’s spending on education, column 6, an increase in voters’ income
level increases the probability of voting for low voice. Here, I conclude that voters’
income level becomes a determinant factor in the increase of voting for low voice
probability in education policies, Figure 5.6, compared to healthcare policies.
The left-right ideology positions of voters are added as another control variable to
the multivariate regression model in columns 7 and 8. This variable takes values
between 0 and 1, 0 representing an extreme leftist voter. Hence investigating the
coefficient of Left-Right ideology variable on column 7 shows us positive impact of
ideology on the probability of voting for low voice. This means that the more right-
wing a voter is the more they vote for the candidate with low voice in healthcare.
However, this result is not statistically significant. Interestingly, the direction of the
ideology coefficient changes when voters evaluate education policies. In column 8,
the ideology coefficient shows that the more right-wing a voter is the probability
of voting for low voice decreases. Voter’s monthly household income level variable
maintain its significance levels and the direction of their coefficients do not change in
columns 7 and 8. Thus, the ideology variable in columns 7 and 8 demonstrates the
importance of low voice on the probability of voting for low voice by the change in
ideology. Right-wing voters are more responsive to low-pitched voices relative to left-
wing voters when the policy proposal is about healthcare whereas left-wing voters are
more responsive to low-pitched voices in policies about education. Unfortunately,
this intuition behind the direction of coefficients is not supported by statistical
significance.
In all columns, policy difference in all levels have a significantly negative effect on the
probability of voting for low voice. And the interaction terms leads us to interpret
the coefficient parallel to what I presented in t-test tables and Table 5.10. Female
candidates benefit from the advantages of having a low-pitched voice more than
male candidates, since their probability of getting elected, holding everything else
constant, is relatively higher than male candidates when they advocate for a less
desirable monetary policy.
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Table 5.11 Logistic Regression Results on Probability of Voting for Low Voice
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability of Voting for Low Voice Healthcare Education Healthcare Education Healthcare Education Healthcare Education
Policy Difference= 200 TL -0.786*** -0.701** -0.668*** -0.702** -0.668*** -0.715** -0.669*** -0.720**
(0.240) (0.278) (0.235) (0.279) (0.235) (0.284) (0.235) (0.286)
Policy Difference= 400 TL -0.730*** -0.645** -0.608** -0.646** -0.608** -0.659** -0.609** -0.662**
(0.252) (0.275) (0.247) (0.276) (0.247) (0.281) (0.247) (0.283)
Policy Difference= 600 TL -0.644** -0.729*** -0.518* -0.729*** -0.518* -0.744*** -0.518* -0.748***
(0.287) (0.257) (0.286) (0.258) (0.286) (0.263) (0.286) (0.265)
Policy Difference= 800 TL -0.985*** -0.951*** -0.877*** -0.953*** -0.877*** -0.972*** -0.877*** -0.977***
(0.264) (0.251) (0.261) (0.251) (0.261) (0.256) (0.262) (0.259)
Policy Difference= 1000 TL -1.456*** -1.150*** -1.397*** -1.152*** -1.396*** -1.175*** -1.397*** -1.181***
(0.255) (0.238) (0.261) (0.238) (0.261) (0.241) (0.261) (0.242)
Female Candidate (dummy) -0.298 -0.523* -0.284 -0.511* -0.288 -0.482* -0.300 -0.492*
(0.291) (0.268) (0.296) (0.269) (0.297) (0.279) (0.300) (0.284)
Policy Difference= 200 TL x Female Candidate 0.754** 1.096*** 0.636* 1.098*** 0.636* 1.118*** 0.636* 1.132***
(0.360) (0.387) (0.357) (0.387) (0.357) (0.391) (0.357) (0.398)
Policy Difference= 400 TL x Female Candidate 0.697* 0.794** 0.576 0.794** 0.576 0.810** 0.576 0.817**
(0.371) (0.387) (0.368) (0.387) (0.368) (0.393) (0.369) (0.399)
Policy Difference= 600 TL x Female Candidate 0.0843 0.438 -0.0439 0.438 -0.0441 0.448 -0.0444 0.445
(0.392) (0.348) (0.392) (0.349) (0.392) (0.354) (0.392) (0.360)
Policy Difference= 800 TL x Female Candidate 0.395 0.631* 0.285 0.632* 0.285 0.646* 0.285 0.643*
(0.371) (0.354) (0.369) (0.355) (0.370) (0.360) (0.370) (0.366)
Policy Difference= 1000 TL x Female Candidate 0.529 0.506 0.466 0.506 0.466 0.519 0.466 0.508
(0.371) (0.342) (0.376) (0.343) (0.376) (0.347) (0.376) (0.353)
Female Voter (dummy) 0.238 0.142 0.237 0.115 0.246 0.0433
(0.239) (0.195) (0.239) (0.189) (0.237) (0.191)
Monthly Income Level 0.00621 0.0763*** 0.00301 0.0836***
(0.0334) (0.0275) (0.0338) (0.0283)
Left-Right Ideology 0.282 -0.599
(0.596) (0.449)
Constant 0.857*** 0.756*** 0.748*** 0.698*** 0.711** 0.118 0.617* 0.304
(0.188) (0.192) (0.213) (0.202) (0.297) (0.297) (0.365) (0.340)
Observations 1,638 1,692 1,602 1,692 1,602 1,692 1,602 1,674
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 5.5 Marginal Effect of Voter’s Sex on the Probability of Voting for Low Voice
(a) Education (b) Healthcare
* Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the predictions calculated from conditional
standard errors.
Figure 5.6 Marginal Effect of Voter’s Income Level on the Probability of Voting for
Low Voice in Education
(a) Male Candidate (b) Female Candidate




Past literature demonstrated the political benefits of having a low-pitched voice
both empirically and experimentally (Anderson and Klofstad 2012; Klofstad 2017;
Laustsen, Petersen, and Klofstad 2015; Tigue et al. 2012). This study contributes
to the voice pitch bias literature by integrating voice pitch manipulation and candi-
dates’ policy stance. Moreover, the results obtained from the baseline model for the
candidates’ comparison and voters’ perception of trustworthiness and competence
strengthen the literature which lacks to integrate the trade-off between low-pitched
voice and policy stance.
Low voice, a physiological characteristic, sounds more masculine (Feinberg, Jones,
DeBruine, Moore, Law Smith, Cornwell, Tiddeman, Boothroyd, and Perrett 2005;
Feinberg et al. 2008; Jones et al. 2010). As previous research shows, voters per-
ceive the candidates with a low-pitched voice more trustworthy and more com-
petent (Klofstad, Anderson, and Nowicki 2015; O’Connor and Barclay 2017; Puts
et al. 2007). Here, I find that trustworthiness and competence perceptions are signif-
icantly higher for both female and male candidates with a low voice. However, this
effect is stronger for the perception of competence. Hence, masculine voices,i.e. low
voices, are perceived as more trustworthy and more competent. In a political and
electoral environment, both trust and competence characteristics play determinant
roles in increasing the probability of being elected. In parallel with this intuition,
the electability of the candidates with low voices is higher compared to an opponent
with a high voice (Klofstad and Anderson 2018; Pavela Banai, Banai, and Bovan
2017; Searles et al. 2017; Tigue et al. 2012).
This thesis studies the effect of policy stance on the electability of candidates with
low-pitched voices under two political issues; education and healthcare. Multivari-
ate logistic regression results show that voters significantly switch voting from the
low-pitched candidate to the high-pitched candidate as the low-pitched candidate
incrementally offers to lower his or her expenditures on basic public services. The
effect of policy difference on the decrease in the probability of voting for low voice
maintains its importance and significance in both education and healthcare issues
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and also when the candidate is female or male. Even though there is a decrease in
their probabilities of winning the election, for a long period, low voice candidates
still received more than .50% of the votes on average. However, what I found is that
voters are more responsive to a small incremental decrease in the monetary pol-
icy of low voice male candidates compared to low voice female candidates. Female
candidates, both in education and healthcare issues, benefit from their low-pitched
voice characteristics longer than male candidates. Also, the findings show that vot-
ers’ gender does not create any significant discrimination between voting for low
voice female or male candidate. Hence, I claim that both female and male voters
prefer more masculine voices in both education and healthcare policies, similar to
the findings of Tigue et al. (2012). This study differs from the findings of Klofstad,
Anderson, and Peters (2012) since their findings suggested that male voters prefer
low voice male candidates.
Voters’ monthly household income level significantly increases votes for low voice in
education policies however this increase is negligible in healthcare policies. I assert
that this difference in the preference for low voice by policy issue comes from the
survey sample from a private university and the effect of the current global pan-
demic, Covid-19. Since the findings and the literature suggest that voters perceive
low voices as more masculine and more competent, asking for a more stable and
well-functioning education system in Turkey can be one of the underlining reasons
why the voters with more monthly household income significantly vote more for
the low voice candidate, i.e. more masculine and hence more competent and trust-
worthy. Hence, in our sample, as the participants’ monthly household income level
increases, they pay less attention on the differences in the monetary policy and more
attention to the personal characteristics of the candidates. On the other hand, the
healthcare system in Turkey provides public services in a stabilized system to cit-
izens. However, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, health policies become more and
more important hence, any monetary decrease in healthcare spending may lessen
the votes received by the low voice candidate. Overall, I believe this thesis has real-
life implications especially on increasing the probability of being elected by lowering
the candidate’s voice pitch, especially the electability of female candidates. Since
women have naturally more high-pitched voice range than men, women can be in a
disadvantageous position when running with a male opponent.
This study had some limitations. First of all, the sample included mainly under-
graduate students which caused to lessen variation in some voter characteristics such
as age and education. Future research should include a more representative data
that allows controlling for a variety of voter characteristics. In future research, the
sample should be larger to increase the external validity of the study. The survey
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included only two policy issues, education, and healthcare which are mostly associ-
ated with women (Searles et al. 2017). Hence adding more variety of policy issues
can help distinguish the impact of policy differences on the electability of low voice
candidates on issues such as military, foreign policy, and economics. Lastly, I believe
this study lacks to take into account a more comparative analysis of voter behavior.
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Survey Questions including Voice Recordings
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Survey Questions including Demographics
Please mark the appropriate answers to all questions below:
What is your year of birth?





Prefer not to answer






Prefer not to answer
Don’t know




Associate degree in college (2-year)
Undergraduate degree in college (4-year)
Student in an undergraduate program (4-year)
Graduate degree
Student in a graduate program
If you consider the past six months, salary, rent, pension, etc. of all family members,
considering their income, the average total monthly household income is closest to
45
which of the following groups?
Less than 1000 TL
1000 TL - 2999 TL
3000 TL - 4999 TL
5000 TL - 6999 TL
7000 TL - 8999 TL
9000 TL - 10 999 TL
11 000 TL - 12 999 TL
13 000 TL - 14 999 TL
15 000 TL - 16 999 TL
17 000 TL - 18 999 TL
19 000 TL - 20 999 TL
More than 21 000 TL
Did you vote in the last election?
Yes
No
We often hear that "right" and "left" are mentioned in political matters. Below is
a scale consisting of 10 points, with ’1’ on the far left of the score and ’10’ on the
right. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
Generally speaking, would you say that "Most people can be trusted" or "that you
must be very careful in dealing with people"?
Most people can be trusted
I must be very careful in dealing with people
In general, do you think men or women in elected office are better at handling








Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Extremely dissatisfied
How important is it for the state to provide education to the public? Can you
answer according to this ruler, which means "0" is not important at all and "10" is
absolutely important?
Finally, when completing this questionnaire, with which tool did you listen to the
voice recordings?
Headphone
Speakers
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